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Abstract
This paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms
of auctions with costly participation, and shows that, when biddersvaluation distri-
bution is concave, there is a simple condition to rank the equilibrium competition of
those auctions. It also investigates how the results are related to stochastic ordering
of biddersvaluation distributions, and provides some illustrative examples.
Keywords: auctions; participation costs; competition; concave distribution; rst
order stochastic dominance
JEL Classication: D44; D82
1 Introduction
In auctions with participation costs, the degrees of competition, which is measured by
the numbers of participating bidders, are endogenously determined. It is a natural and
important question to explore the possible di¤erence in equilibrium competition in those
auctions, particularly in comparison to social optimum. In this paper, we study three
common forms of auctions with costly participation, and complement the current results
in the literature by providing some simple conditions that enable us to clearly rank the
degrees of equilibrium competition in those auctions.
The literature on auctions with costly participation can roughly be divided into two
categories, depending on who pays the costs. One is search auction, denoted by As, where
a seller incurs costs to attract bidders to the auction (Crémer, et al 2007; Szech, 2011; Li
and Xu, 2016). The other is auctions with costly entry, where bidders need to pay entry
costs to participate in the auction, which can be further summarized to two branches: in
the rst branch, denoted by Au, bidders make entry decisions before knowing their true
valuations of the product (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Levin and Smith, 1994); and in
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the second, denoted by Ak, bidders make entry decisions only after learning their true
valuations (Samuelson, 1985; Tan and Yilankaya, 2006; Cao and Tian, 2010).
In the case of search auction As, Szech (2011) shows that when bidders valuation
distribution is of increasing failure rate (IFR), a seller will invite more than the socially
optimal number of bidders to the auction. This over-invitation result is also reported by
Li and Xu (2016) in descending auctions, yet under di¤erent assumptions. In the auction
of Au, McAfee and McMillan (1987) show in their seminal paper that the equilibrium
number of participating bidders is just equal to the socially optimal one.
In this paper, we complement the above results by investigating the degree of equilib-
rium competition in the auction of Ak. In this case, the number of participating bidders
is a random variable, whose expectation is related to the total number of potential bidders
in the market. We show that, when biddersvaluation distribution is concave, the ex-
pected number of participating bidders in Ak is strictly increasing in the total number of
potential bidders, which enables us to provide a simple condition on ranking the degrees
of equilibrium competition between Ak and Au. Moreover, when biddersvaluation dis-
tribution is uniform, there is a robust ranking result of equilibrium competition across As,
Au and Ak, regardless of the magnitude of the participation cost and the total number of
potential bidders. Finally, we investigate how the results are related to stochastic ordering
of biddersvaluation distributions, and provide some illustrative examples.
2 the Model
Consider a standard auction without a reserve price, where there are N 2 [1;1) potential
bidders in the market who may participate. Participation in the auction is costly, and
that cost can be paid either by the seller, such as in As, or by the bidders, such as in Au
and Ak. We assume there is a unit participation cost of c 2 (0; 1) for each bidder. The
bidders are ex ante homogeneous, whose valuation V conforms to the distribution of F on
[0; 1] with density f > 0.
When there are n  N participating bidders, indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; n, let fVigni=1 be
n independent draws from F , where Vi is bidder is valuation. The distribution of F is
common knowledge, while vi, the realization of Vi, is privately observed only by bidder i.
We denote Vk:n the kth highest valuation of the n bidderssuch that
V1:n  V2:n      Vn:n:
For the order statistics of Vk:n, let Fk:n and fk:n be its cumulative distribution function
and probability density function respectively.
We denote n as the socially optimal number of participating bidders, which maxi-
mizes the expected social welfare. Therefore,
n 2 argmax
n
E [V1:n]  nc;
where E [V1:n] is the expected value of V1:n, and n satises
E [V1:n   V1:n 1]  c > E [V1:n+1   V1:n ] : (1)
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The existence of n is guaranteed by the observation that E [V1:n] is increasing and concave
in n, with limn!1 E [V1:n+1   V1:n] = 0.
3 Ranking Equilibrium Competition
We next consider the degrees of equilibrium competition in the three auctions of As, Au
and Ak, where the seller is a revenue-maximizer, yet not imposing a reserve price.
3.1 Search auction As
In a search auction As, the problem for a revenue-maximizing seller is to
max
n
E [V2:n]  nc: (2)
It is known that when F is of IFR, (2) is a well-dened convex problem. Its solution,
denoted by ns, is given by
E

V2:ns   V2:ns 1
  c > E V2:ns+1   V2:ns :
Lemma 1 (Scezh, 2011) If F is of IFR, then in auction As, a revenue maximizing
seller invites more than the socially optimal number of bidders to the auction, that is,
ns  n:
The intuition is that, bidderswinning rent is decreasing in n, and inviting an extra
bidder will then reduce the expected total surplus of the bidders, which is ignored by the
seller but is taken into account when computing the expected social welfare.
3.2 Auction with entry cost I: Au
There are two stages in the auction of Au: in the second stage, it is a standard auction
among the participating bidders; in the rst stage, knowing what will follow, each bidder
decides whether or not to incur c and enter the auction. In the auction of Au, the bidders
make entry decisions before learning their true valuations.
When there are n participating bidders, the expected prot for a bidder is
E (n) =
1
n
E [V1:n   V2:n]  c = E [V1:n   V1:n 1]  c: (3)
The equilibrium number of participating bidders, denoted by nu, is therefore given by
E

V1:nu   V1:nu 1
  c > E V1:nu+1   V1:nu ;
which is the same as (1). We then have the following result.
Lemma 2 (McAfee and McMillan, 1987) In auction Au where bidders make entry
decisions before learning their valuations, equilibrium entry is e¢ cient, that is,
nu = n
.
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This happens because the bidders make entry decisions before knowing their valuations,
and therefore the ex ante information rent is zero for the bidders. As the expected social
welfare is equal to the sum of the expected auction revenue and the expected payo¤ of the
participating bidders, which is equal to zero, then revenue maximization for the seller is
equivalent to welfare maximization.
3.3 Auction with entry cost II: Ak
The setup of the auction of Ak is the same as that of Au, except that now the bidders
make entry decisions after learning their true valuations. It is well known that there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with cuto¤ valuation v^ such that
v^  F1:N 1 (v^)  c = 0, (4)
where N is the total number of potential bidders. Moreover, when F is concave, there
does not exist asymmetric equilibrium (Tan and Yilankaya, 2006). From (4), the expected
number of participating bidders, denoted by nk (N), is
nk (N) = N [1  F (v^ (N))] ; (5)
from the property of binomial distribution.
Lemma 3 v^ (N) is increasing in N , and limN!1 v^ (N) = 1.
Proof. Suppose N can take real value, and by simple di¤erentiation,
@v^
@N
=   lnF (v^)
1
v^ + (N   1) f(v^)F (v^)
> 0: (6)
Second, from monotone convergence theorem, we know that the sequence of v^ (N) con-
verges to its supreme, denoted by v. If v < 1, then limN!1 v^ (N)F1:N 1 (v^ (N)) = 0 < c,
which results in a contradiction.
We are more interested in the properties of nk (N), and have the following result.
Lemma 4 If F (x) is concave, then nk (N) is increasing in N , and n

k = limN!1 n

k (N) =
  ln c.
Proof. If F (x) is concave, then f (x)  F (x) =x. From (5) and (6), we have
@nk
@N
= [1  F (v^)] +Nf (v^) lnF (v^)
1
v^ + (N   1) f(v^)F (v^)
 [1  F (v^)] +Nf (v^) lnF (v^)
f(v^)
F (v^) + (N   1) f(v^)F (v^)
= [1  F (v^)] + F (v^) lnF (v^)  0:
Second, applying lHôpitals rule,
lim
N!1
nk (N) = lim
N!1

c
v^ (N)
 1
N 1
8<: N2 [ln c  ln v^ (N)](N   1)2 + N2(N   1) lnF (v^)1 + (N   1) f(v^)v^F (v^)
9=;
=   ln c;
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because
lim
N!1
v^ (N) = 1; lim
N!1

c
v^ (N)
 1
N 1
= 1; lim
N!1
N
(N   1)
N lnF (v^)
1 + (N   1) f(v^)v^F (v^)
= 0.
Lemma 4 then enables us to provide a simple condition on the comparison between
nk (N) and n

u, as follows.
Proposition 5 When F (v) is concave,
 If nk  nu, then for any given nite N , nk (N) < nu;
 If nk > nu, then there exists a nite N0 such that, nk (N) < nu i¤ N < N0.
Moreover, when V conforms to uniform distribution, there is a robust ranking result
on equilibrium competition across the auctions of As, Au and Ak.
Lemma 6 If V  U [0; 1], then for any c 2 (0; 1) and any nite N 2 [1;1),
nk (N) < n

u = n
  ns.
Proof. As V  U [0; 1], then F is both concave and of IFR. From Lemma 4, nk (N) is
increasing in N , and limN!1 nk (N) = n

k =   ln c. When V  U [0; 1], the condition for
nu is
nu (n

u + 1)  c 1 < (nu + 1) (nu + 2) :
When n = nk, we have n

k (n

k + 1) =   ln c (1  ln c) < c 1, and therefore nu  nk >
nk (N) for any nite N . The parts of n

u = n
  ns is already proved as above in Lemma
1.
The above ranking results on equilibrium competition provide interesting implications
on public regulations. For example, in auction Ak, if there is insu¢ cient entry in the
auction, according to Proposition 5, then a regulator may encourage competition by sub-
sidizing biddersentry costs, which may induce more e¢ cient allocations in equilibrium.
Similar argument also applies for the case of excessive competition, such as in auction As.
3.4 Further discussion
We next investigate how nk (N) is related to the stochastic ordering of biddersvaluation
distributions. Suppose biddersvaluations are now independent draws from the distribu-
tion of G on [0; 1], with G FOSD F in terms of rst order stochastic dominance (FOSD).
If we denote the expected number of participating bidders under G by ~nk (N), we then
have the following result.
Lemma 7 If G FOSD F , then ~nk (N)  nk (N).
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Proof. If G FOSD F , then G1:N FOSD F1:N . From (4), we have v^  F1:N 1 (v^) =
c = ~v G1:N 1 (~v), where ~v is the new cuto¤ valuation under G, which implies v^  ~v and
F (v^)  G (~v). The result then follows from (5).
Finally, let us consider a family of concave distributions in the form of F (v) = v,
indexed by   1 and ordered in FOSD. We are interested in how the ranking of equilib-
rium competition between Au and Ak is related to . First, in the auction of Ak, from
(4) and (5), the expected number of participating bidders is
nk (N;) = N
h
1  c (N 1)+1
i
;
which is increasing in , with its limit nk = limN!1 n

k (N;) =   ln c. Second, in the
auction of Au, from (3), we have
E (n;) =

[ (n  1) + 1] [n+ 1]   c;
and the equilibrium number of bidders, nu (), is given by E (nu;)  0 > E (nu + 1;).
If E (nk;)  0, then nu ()  nk > nk (N;) for any nite N (Proposition 5).
Figure 1 below provides an illustration of the ranking result in the (c; ) space. In the
diagram, the blue curve plots the set of all points (c; ) such that E (nk;) = 0, which
dene an implicit function of  =  (c). In Figure 1, for each c,
 If    (c), then E (nk;)  0, and therefore nk (N;) < nu () for any nite N ;
 If  <  (c), then E (nk;) < 0, then there exists a nite Nc such that nk (N;) <
nu () i¤ N < Nc.
Figure 1: nk (N;) vs. n

u ()
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